Deterministic public-key encryption, introduced by Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill (CRYPTO 2007), is an important database encryption technique which allows quick, logarithmic-time, search over encrypted data items. The technique is most effective in scenarios where frequent search queries are performed over a huge database of highly sensitive, yet unpredictable, data items such as credit card or social security numbers. Such databases, however, are also the ideal target for hackers since even partial data leaks may reveal significantly damaging information to the attacker.
Introduction
The notion of semantic security for public key encryption schemes was introduced in the seminal work of Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] . While this strong notion of security is desirable in many applications, it requires that the encryption algorithm must be a random process. This creates a significant performance bottleneck if, for example, one wants to perform fast search over many encrypted data items. To address this issue, Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill [BBO07] initiated the study of deterministic public-key encryption (D-PKE) schemes. In D-PKE schemes, the encryption algorithm is required to be a deterministic function of the message. Consequently, D-PKE cannot satisfy any meaningful notion of security for low-entropy plaintext distributions. Bellare et al. demonstrated that a strong notion of security can in fact be realized for relatively high-entropy plaintext distributions. Several follow up works then further investigated security notions for deterministic encryption and presented standard model constructions [BFOR08, BFO08, O'N10, BS11, MPRS12, FOR12, RSV13].
Deterministic encryption is a promising technique for building "encrypted databases" [PRZB11, PRZB12] . It is most effective in scenarios where frequent search queries are performed over a huge database of highly sensitive, yet unpredictable, data items such as credit card or social security numbers. This is in fact the ideal setting for deterministic encryption: on one hand, the "hard-toguess" nature of credit-card/SSN numbers ensures that they are well protected even if encryption is deterministic; on the other hand, logarithmic search-time ensures good response-time even if the database is potentially huge and search queries are rather frequent.
Ironically, what makes such databases ideal for deterministic encryption, also makes them a highly sought after target by hackers since even partial data leaks may reveal significantly damaging information to the attacker. The attacks on Heartland Payment Systems (2008) and TJX Companies (2006) resulted in a theft of more than 100 million credit card numbers. The history of such attacks on payment systems is quite long, and shows heavy financial losses to the payment card industry (PCI) [Arm12] .
It is well understood in the PCI industry that encryption alone does not suffice to prevent such attacks. Due to the high impact nature of the data, extensive measures are taken to ensure a timely response in case of a data breach. We argue that for the PCI industry, or any other system protecting the high-business impact (HBI) data, it is a far superior design choice to use an appropriate "leakage-resilient" encryption scheme (that automatically defends against key exposures as much as possible) than a "regular" one. This is because the potential impact of using such a scheme goes much further than simply fending off small key exposures. Often, a small partial leakage acts as a stepping stone for a more sophisticated attack. By automatically defending against such attacks, a good encryption scheme nips the problem in the bud. In addition, it buys the system administrators valuable time to prepare an effective response in case of a data breach. There is another benefit of using a leakage-resilient scheme that can tolerate a "good leakage-rate." If a large scale breach of data occurs, the sysadmin can almost be sure that the decryption-key of the system must have been completely leaked (since otherwise the data is protected). As a result, in the post diagnosis of an attack, it can help identify the real source of the data leak.
Despite its importance to real world systems, a comprehensive treatment of deterministic PKE in the presence of leakage does not exist. In fact, most known D-PKE schemes are not at all resilient to leakage. We fill this gap by initiating the study of leakage-resilient deterministic public-key encryption. We adapt existing security notions for deterministic PKE to the continual leakage model [DHLAW10, BKKV10] and present constructions that achieve them.
We wish to note that although several leakage-resilient schemes for randomized PKE are known [DP08, AGV09, DKL09, ADN + 10, NS09, BKKV10, DHLAW10, HLWW13], they usually have no implication for D-PKE. This is because the security of randomized PKE crucially relies on the randomness of encryption, which is simply not present in deterministic PKE. In general-even without leakage-there is no direct way of obtaining deterministic PKE schemes from the randomized ones in the standard model; the techniques for constructing deterministic PKE are usually quite different.
We remark that leakage-resilient cryptography [MR04, DP08, ISW03] only attempts to provide an algorithmic defense against side-channel attacks [Koc96, AK97, QS01, OST06] and that too when such a defense is actually possible. Renauld, Standaert, Veyrat-Charvillon, Kamel, and Flandre [RSV + 11] highlight several difficulties in formalizing an appropriate model of leakage for real-world side-channel attacks, and argue that often an algorithmic defense is not possible since the key might have been completely compromised. In such settings, we cannot do anything except for developing alternative methods such as those at the hardware level. However, when the adversary is limited to side-channel attacks that do not fully compromise the system-and it would often be the case-the continual leakage model is essentially as good a model as possible.
The continual memory leakage (CML) model was introduced in [DHLAW10, BKKV10] . In the context of public-key encryption, we envision a system with a fixed public-key pk, along with a (variable) secret key sk which is "refreshed" or "updated" at regular time intervals. In each time interval, the adversary can issue a leakage query of its choice, in the form of a polynomial-time computable function L, and learn L(sk). The adversary can repeat this process for polynomially many time intervals, issuing queries of the form L i , and learning L(sk i ) in the i-th interval. To prevent trivially leaking the whole key, the model asserts that the size of all leakage answers in the i-th intervals is bounded by ρ.|sk i | for every i, where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the leakage parameter of the system and sk i is the secret-key in the i-th interval. It is also required that every sk i should correctly decrypt the ciphertexts under pk, and be roughly of the same size as the initial key of the system. The higher the ρ for a scheme, the higher the amount of leakage it can tolerate. 1 The CML model is indeed a very powerful model since it allows the attacker to potentially learn unbounded leakage on the system's secret memory. In addition to constructions of randomized PKE mentioned above, leakage-resilient schemes for several tasks in a variety of leakage models are now known, e.g., digital signatures [LW10, BSW11, LLW11] , identity-based encryption [BKKV10, CDRW10, LRW11] , interactive proofs [GJS11, Pan14, AGP14] , secure computation [FRR + 10, BGJK12, GR12] , and so on.
Our results. Our goal is to obtain standard model constructions of deterministic PKE which can deliver meaningful security under the CML attack. The security notions for deterministic PKE have evolved over time. Bellare et al. [BBO07] proposed the notions of PRIV1-IND and PRIV-IND security; the former is the most basic notion of security, while the latter was shown in [BFOR08, BFO08] to be one of the strongest notions. In the special setting when plaintext distributions have sufficient block-wise min-entropy, these two notions are actually equivalent. Bellare et al. [BBO07] argued that in the general setting, the plaintext distributions cannot depend on the public-key of the system. However, under special constraints over plaintext distributions, this restriction may not be necessary [BS11, RSV13] .
In this work, we stick to the original setting of [BBO07] , and reformulate PRIV1-IND and PRIV-IND security in the presence of CML attacks. We then construct a deterministic PKE scheme satisfying the PRIV1-IND security under the CML attack. Our scheme is based on the (standard) linear (a.k.a. "matrix DDH") assumption [BBS04, NS09] in bilinear groups, and it can tolerate a leakage-rate up to ρ = 0.5 − o(1). A simpler variant of this scheme has better system parameters, and can tolerate an almost optimal leakage rate of ρ = 1 − o(1); however, it is based on the (stronger) SXDH assumption.
To construct our deterministic PKE, we formulate and construct a "continual leakage resilient" version of lossy trapdoor functions, abbreviated as CLR-LTDF. Lossy trapdoor functions were introduced by Peikert and Waters [PW08] , and have found a vast number of applications in cryptography. We actually work with the more general notion of lossy TDFs, namely all-but-one (ABO) functions, since the simpler definition (consisting of only two families) cannot tolerate even 1 bit of leakage. We believe that our formulation of CLR-LTDF is of independent general interest especially with regard to constructing other leakage-resilient schemes.
We remark that unlike the standard setting where lossy TDFs almost immediately imply D-PKE [BFO08] , CLR-LTDFs do not immediately imply a leakage-resilient D-PKE. The leakage setting is more challenging and the proof that such a reduction is possible, is not straight forward.
An overview of our approach
Bellare et al. [BBO07] show that, in the random-oracle model [BR93] , a semantically secure (randomized) PKE also implies a PRIV-IND secure deterministic PKE; the reduction simply replaces the randomness of encryption by H(m) where H is a random-oracle and m is the message to be encrypted. By using a LR (randomized) PKE in this reduction, we immediately get a LR D-PKE. However, in the standard model, no such general reduction is known. In general, due to the deterministic nature of encryption, D-PKE generally require their own set of techniques.
A prominent technique for constructing deterministic PKE (in the standard model) is based on lossy trapdoor functions [PW08] ; it was given by Boldyreva, Fehr, and O'Neill [BFO08] . Recall that, lossy TDFs define two function families {F inj } and {F lossy }. Functions in the first family are always injective and can be efficiently inverted using a trapdoor. Functions in the other family are always lossy: meaning that the range-size of every function in {F lossy } is much smaller than its domain-size. Therefore, functions in the second family necessarily loose a lot of information about their input. In addition, these two families are computationally indistinguishable: it is hard to decide whether a (properly sampled) function belongs to the injective family or the lossy family. Boldyreva et al. [BFO08] observe that if the lossy mode also acts as a universal hash function then the functions from the injective family (of a lossy TDF) act as a PRIV1-IND secure deterministic-PKE.
A natural idea is to suitably adapt this approach to the leakage setting. Unfortunately, lossy TDFs cannot be leakage-resilient as defined: just one bit of leakage on the trapdoor suffices to tell injective functions from the lossy ones. To make this approach work, we first need to re-formulate the notion of lossy TDFs in the leakage setting and then suitably modify the approach of [BFO08] to obtain a deterministic PKE.
Leakage-resilient lossy TDFs. Since lossy TDFs cannot be leakage-resilient as defined, we work with all-but-one (ABO) functions also introduced in [PW08] . ABO functions define only one family {F } where each f ∈ F takes two inputs. The first input is called a branch b taken from a branch space B. As the name suggests, there exists a unique branch b * ∈ B such that the single input function F (b, ·) is lossy when b = b * and injective otherwise. We consider a notion similar to ABO functions. Specifically, we consider a family of functions {F } which take two inputs where the first input is a branch b. We require that at least one branch b defines a lossy function F (b, ·), and the fraction of all lossy branches is negligible. All other branches define an injective function.
Intuitively, leakage resilience for our functions, should mean that given (f, L f (t), b), where is t is the trapdoor, it is hard to decide whether b is lossy or injective; here L f is the leakage function which can depend on f (but not b, since otherwise we will have the same problem as before). We note that it is of independent interest to consider such functions under various models for leakage L f . However, motivated by our application of deterministic PKE, we will consider the most demanding CML model. Since the CML model requires that the trapdoor should refreshed or updated after each time interval, our functions will have an update algorithm in addition to usual ones for ABO.
The attack model for our functions will then work as follows. Once the description of f is fixed, the adversary will be able to ask (bounded) leakage during each time-interval; the trapdoor for the function f will be updated after each time interval. Once the leakage is complete, the adversary will enter a challenge phase in which it will be given either a lossy branch b * or an injective branch b = b * ; the adversary wins if it successfully guesses the type of the branch. The adversary is not allowed any queries once the challenge branch is given. The formal description appears in later sections.
As mentioned earlier, we call such functions continual leakage-resilient lossy-trapdoor functions or CLR-LTDF. We construct CLR-LTDF under the linear assumption tolerating a leakage fraction of ρ = 0.5 − o(1). A simpler variant of this construction based on SXDH assumption can tolerate almost optimal leakage of ρ = 1 − o(1).
Achieving leakage-resilient D-PKE from CLR-LTDF. Although our formulation of CLR-LTDF seems natural, it remains to be seen if it can prove useful in constructing D-PKE. Let us see if we can use an approach along the lines of Boldyreva et al. [BFO08] .
Suppose that we are given a family of CLR-TDFs. The functions in the family require a branch for evaluation. We need to find a deterministic method to sample the branch. If a branch is chosen and provided with public-parameters, we will not have any leakage-resilience. The adversary can simply check if the branch is lossy or injective via leakage queries. A better idea, following [BFO08] , would be to let the branch b = h(m) where m is the message to be encrypted and h is a universal hash function sampled, say, at the time of setup. If m has sufficient entropy the branch looks random; further if m has enough entropy conditioned on (h, h(m)), we might hope to use the analysis from [BFO08] to argue security. 2 Unfortunately, it does not quite work because the analysis from [BFO08] crucially relies on the fact that the family is a lossy TDF without branches. (If ABO functions are used, then a single branch must be chosen as part of the public-parameters, and used for all evaluations for their analysis to work.) In contrast, in our proposed scheme, the branch changes for almost every sampled message. This results in two main difficulties. Consider the reduction in which the proof will try to reduce the security of our proposed construction to that of the CLR-LTDF. That is, the reduction attempts to correctly guess whether a challenge branch b is injective or lossy with the help of an adversary A who breaks our proposed scheme. The reduction will somehow need to use b to create a correctly generated challenge ciphertext c. For example, in the simplest type of reduction, we may try to ensure that c is an encryption under the branch b for some message, say m. Then, the reduction must ensure that: (1) h(m) = b , and (2) m comes from one distribution if b is injective and from the other distribution if it is lossy.
It turns out rather non-trivial to show that we can design such a reduction and the proposed construction indeed works. However, making this construction work requires us to consider a slightly strengthened version of CLR-LTDFs where the challenge branches can be sampled using an arbitrary, possibly adversarial, algorithm as long as the sampling results in independent and correctly distributed branches. The security is then required to hold even in the presence of some auxiliary information about the challenge branch.
How to construct CLR-LTDF
We now present an overview of our construction of CLR-LTDFs. Our starting point is the ABO construction of [PW08] which works as follows. It samples a n × n matrix A whose entries are, roughly speaking, (ElGamal) encryptions of 0. The function description is then set to g M where M = A + b * I, I denotes the identity matrix, and b * is lossy branch. The function evaluation on (b, x) is g (M−bI)x , which is easily inverted if x ∈ {0, 1} n , given A, b, b * . To ensure lossiness when b = b * , the randomness of the ElGamal encryptions are "correlated" in a special manner.
A natural idea is to replace the ElGamal encryption with an appropriate continual LR PKE scheme. The hope is that leakage-resilience of ABO can now be reduced to leakage-resilience of the PKE in use. The central difficulty such a reduction faces is as follows. The reduction needs to provide the adversary, say A, the description of a function f from the family in the beginning, and a challenge branch b in the end. Clearly, whether b is injective or lossy, should somehow depend on whether the challenge ciphertext c obtained from the PKE-challenger encrypts 0 or 1. 3 Since c is not known ahead of time, the reduction must be able to find a b when c becomes known, yet this b should make the function injective or lossy depending on what c encrypts.
We do not know if such a black-box reduction is possible in general. However, it might be possible to make this approach work by relying on specific constructions of LR PKE. Our construction uses a similar approach and uses BKKV encryption instead of ElGamal. A key property of this encryption scheme is that it supports (almost) additive homomorphic encryptions. This allows us to use the branches as a one-time pad to mask the diagonal entries. However, we still cannot obtain an injective or lossy branch from a challenge ciphertext of BKKV in a black-box manner. Instead, we directly work with "matrix DDH" challenger, and use the ideas from BKKV, to directly prove that our construction is leakage-resilient. More specifically, our reduction directly works with the matrix DDH challenger, but relies on the structure of BKKV encryption and the fact that random subspaces are leakage resilient (Theorem 2.1, [BKKV10] ) to answer the leakage queries of the adversary. The reduction only knows a key from a random subspace of the entire key space, and therefore can fail to decrypt some special ciphertexts. These special cipertexts will correspond to the DDH challenges, and used to define the challenge branch b . A description of BKKV encryption scheme is given in the preliminaries.
Related work on lossy TDFs. There has been a significant follow up work on extending lossy TDFs such as all-but-N functions defined by Hemnway et al. [HLOV11] , all-but-many functions defined by Hofheinz [Hof12] , and identity-based lossy TDFs defined by Bellare et al. [BKPW12] . Likewise, in addition to the constructions in these works, several other works have presented constructions of (standard) lossy TDFs based on a variety of assumptions [FGK + 10, Wee12]. Qin et al. [QLCC13] propose an alternate type of leakage-resilient lossy-TDF in which a master-key mk is selected first; injective/lossy functions f are chosen later, and mk generates trapdoors for injective f . Leakage is allowed only on mk, and no leakage is allowed after f is fixed. It is not clear how to use this version for our application of deterministic-PKE.
Preliminaries
Standard notation. We use uppercase roman letters A, X, . . . for representing sets and matrices, lowercase roman letters to denote elements of a set x ∈ X, and bold for vectors x ∈ X n . When X is a set, x $ ← X denotes a uniformly sampled x ∈ X. Notation x, y represents standard scalar product of vectors x and y. If A is a matrix then Ax denotes the standard matrix product where x is seen as a column vector (with scalar coordinates). The transpose of a matrix A is denoted by A T . For vectors (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we denote by span(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and kernel(x 1 , . . . , x n ) the linear-span and the kernel space of these vectors.
Sets N, R, Z and Z p denote the sets of natural numbers, real numbers, integers, and integers modulo p respectively. We let Rank m×n r (S) be the set of all m × n matrices of rank r whose entries are from S, whenever such a rank is well defined, e.g., when S = Z p . Given any function f , |f (·)| represents the size of image space of f . A function µ : N → R is negligible if it approaches zero faster than every polynomial.
Probability distributions will be denoted by calligraphic letters X , and x ← X denotes an element x drawn according to X . Uniform distribution over {0, 1} n is denoted by U n . The statistical distance between two probability distributions X and Y over the same support S is denoted by
The min-entropy of a distribution X that is defined over a set Ω is defined as H ∞ (X ) = min ω∈Ω lg (1/ Pr[X = ω]). An α-source is a distribution X with H ∞ (X ) ≥ α, and the min-entropy rate of an α-source over the set {0, 1} n is α/n. A distribution X is -close to an α-source if there exists an α-source Y such that ∆(X , Y) ≤ . The average conditional min-entropy [DORS08] of a random variable X given Y is defined as:
. A family of hash functions H = {h i : {0, 1} n → R} is said to universal if for every distinct
The following two lemmata were proved in [DORS08] (the first lemma is the generalization of classical left-over-hash lemma [ILL89, HILL99] to the case of average min-entropy):
Lemma 1 (Generalized LHL [DORS08] ). Let X , Y be random variable such that X ∈ {0, 1} n and H ∞ (X |Y) ≥ α. Let H be a family of universal hash functions. Then, for h ← H, we have that
and m is the output length of h.
Lemma 2. If Y has 2 r values and Z is any random variable, thenH
New notation. We will use two types of matrices: matrices of scalars, denoted by uppercase letters A = [a ij ] and matrices of vectors, denoted by bold uppercase letters A = [a ij ]. When we want to be explicit about the dimension of a matrix A, we will write A m×n ; define A m×n similarly. Let A m×n = [a ij ] be a matrix of vectors, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) T be a column vector (with scalar coordinates), then we define:
. That is, each y i is a linear combination of the vectors in the i-th row of matrix A, where the scalars of the linear combination are the coordinates of vector x.
Let G be a group of prime order p, and g be its generator. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n p , we define g x := (g x 1 , . . . , g xn ); similarly, we define matrices
where A is a matrix of scalars a ij ∈ Z p , and A is a matrix of vectors a ij ∈ Z p (for some ∈ N) for all values of i and j.
Finally, when dealing with vectors x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) both in Z n p , we denote by +, −, and · the component-wise addition, subtraction, and multiplication modulo p. In particular, x · y = (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ) with product taken modulo p. However, when we deal with vectors u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) both in G n for some group G, we use · to denote the group operation of G and define u · v = (u 1 · v 1 , . . . , u n · v n ) as the component-wise group operation.
Bilinear groups and the matrix DDH assumption. We work with multiplicative groups G, G T of prime order p, equipped with a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G × G → G T satisfying the following property: for every (a, b) ∈ Z 2 p and generator g ∈ G, e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab . We require that the group operation and the map e are efficiently computable. We will assume an efficient generation algorithm G, which on input a security parameter λ, outputs the description of groups G, G T of order p, the map e, and a generator g where p is a prime number of length O(λ).
The "matrix DDH" assumption [BBS04, NS09] , also known as the 3-linear assumption, 4 states that it is hard to tell whether a randomly chosen matrix A ∈ Z n×3 p has rank 2 or 3 when given only g A where g ∈ G is the generator of a prime-oder bilinear group G. Formally, for every polynomial n := n(λ), we have that distributions
are computationally indistinguishable, where aux := (p, G, G T , g, e) ← G(λ) and λ ∈ N. It follows from this assumption [NS09] that for all polynomially bounded n, ≥ 3, r ≥ 2, t ≥ 0, a random rank-r matrix is computationally indistinguishable from a random rank-(r + t) matrix when given in the exponent.
Random subspaces are leakage-resilient [BKKV10] . Brakerski, Kalai, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [BKKV10] prove the following theorem which serves as as important tool in building their continual leakage resilient PKE scheme. The theorem roughly states that random subspaces of Z n p are "leakage resilient" provided that the leakage is "small" and independent of the subspace.
More formally, let X ⊆ Z n p be a random subspace, x 1 , x 2 two random vectors in X and u 1 , u 2 two random vectors from the entire space. Let L : Z n p → W be a leakage function independent of X. The theorem states that if leakage is bounded (i.e. |W | is small), then L(x) is statistically close to L(u) even given the subspace X.
The above theorem also works with leakage on two vectors, but with slightly worse bounds, as stated below.
Remark. An immediate corollary of these theorems is that they also apply to the subspaces of smaller dimension subspaces of Z n p . Following is an immediate corollary of this theorem, which states that the above theorem applies to subspaces of smaller dimension subspaces of Z n p as well:
BKKV encryption scheme. Our result uses the BKKV encryption which works as follows. The key generation algorithm chooses two uniformly random -dimensional vectors v 1 and v 2 with elements from Z p , and another vector t uniformly at random from the orthogonal subspace of v 1 and v 2 . The public key is set to be (g v 1 , g v 2 ) and the secret key is g t , where g is a generator of a bilinear pairing group G and exponentiation happens component-wise:
To encrypt the bit 0, the encryption algorithm outputs a linear combination of v 1 and v 2 in the exponent: g c 1 v 1 +c 2 v 2 . The encryption of 1 is a completely random vector in the exponent. Notice that encryptions of 0 have exponents orthogonal to the secret key, while exponents of encryptions of 1 are not orthogonal to the secret key with overwhelming probability. During decryption, the respective components from the secret key and the ciphertext are paired via the bilinear pairing and the results are multiplied. As a result, if the vectors in the exponent are orthogonal, the result is the identity element. Otherwise, it is a random group element.
An important property of this encryption scheme is that it is almost additively homomorphic. It is easily shown that multiplying component-wise an encryption of b 1 ∈ {0, 1} with an encryption of b 2 ∈ {0, 1} provides an encryption of b 1 + b 2 , except when b 1 = b 2 = 1 where you get an encryption of 1.
Lossy TDF under Continual Leakage

Our model
As noted earlier, we will define a "branch" based version of lossy trapdoor functions. To evaluate the function, an evaluator must specify a branch in addition to the input to the function. Some branches will be "lossy" whereas most other will be injective. The set of branches will be denoted B λ for security parameter λ.
This primitive is closer to the all-but-one (ABO) primitive of Peikert and Waters [PW08] ; the only difference is that in our formulation more than one branch might be lossy. In fact, there may exist branches which are neither injective nor "sufficiently lossy." Nevertheless, fraction of such branches will be negligible, and a random branch will be injective with overwhelming probability.
The leakage-resilience is formulated by requiring that it is hard to distinguish lossy branches from injective even under a continual leakage attack on the trapdoor. We will use a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1) to capture the leakage as the fraction of the length the secret-key. That is, in any given time period, the adversary can learn any PPT leakage function of the trapdoor t with output length at most ρ|t|. We now present the formal definition.
Lossy trapdoor functions resilient to continual memory leakage. Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter, and n := n(λ) and k := k(λ) be polynomials in λ. Parameter n denotes the length of the input to the function(s) and k is the lossiness parameter. For convenience, we define the residual information parameter r := r(λ) = n(λ) − k(λ). Let ρ := {0, 1} poly(λ) → [0, 1) be a leakage tolerance parameter, representing the length of the leakage function as a fraction of the length the trapdoor. Finally, let {B λ } λ ∈ N be the ensemble of branch-spaces, where B λ = {0, 1} poly(λ) . 5 A collection of (n, k, ρ)-continual leakage resilient lossy trapdoor functions (CLR-LTDF) with the domain {0, 1} n and branch collection B = {B λ } is given by a tuple of four (possibly probabilistic) polynomial-time (in λ) algorithms (Setup, Eval, Inv, Update) with the following specifications:
Setup(1 λ , b * ) takes as input 1 λ and a branch b * ∈ B λ , and outputs (pp, t) where pp is a function index and t is its trapdoor.
Eval(pp, b, x) is a deterministic algorithm which, given pp, a branch b ∈ B λ , and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , outputs a value y.
Update(pp, t) is a randomized algorithm which, given pp, and a trapdoor t for pp, outputs a new trapdoor t such that |t | = |t|. We call t to be the refreshed or updated trapdoor.
Inv(pp, t * , y) is a deterministic algorithm which given pp, a trapdoor t * , and a value y, outputs either x ∈ {0, 1} n or ⊥. Usually, either t * = t or t * is obtained by repeated (at most polynomial) application of Update(pp, ·).
We require that the following correctness and lossiness requirements hold.
5 We can also consider more structured sets instead of {0, 1} poly(λ) . For example, a very intuitive and convenient choice is B λ = Z m p ; i.e., the branches vectors in Z m p for some m = poly(n) and p is a prime of length λ. However, too much structure in B λ should be avoided to ensure non-triviality and usefulness of the primitive.
1. Injective, and invertible, on almost all branches: except for a negligible fraction of b ∈ B λ \ {b * }, algorithm Eval(pp, b, ·) computes a (deterministic) injective function, which can be inverted using either the trapdoor t or any of its polynomially-many refreshings. That is, for every polynomial q := q(λ), every sufficiently large λ, every x ∈ {0, 1} n , and every
where E is the event that (pp, t) ← Setup(1 λ , b * ), b ← B λ , t q is obtained by repeatedly applying the function Update(pp, ·) to its own output (with fresh randomness) q times, starting from the initial input t and µ is a negligible function. 6
2. Lossy at the given branch b * : for every b * ∈ B λ , except with negligible probability over the randomness of Setup, we have:
Finally, we require the following hardness properties.
1. Indistinguishability of lossy branch under continual memory leakage: We require that for every PPT algorithm A, it holds that
where the variable Game
, 1} as follows:
The game proceeds between a challenger and adversary A in following stages:
(a) Init: The challenger chooses two branches (b, b * ) uniformly from the set B λ and samples (pp, t) ← Setup(1 λ , b * ). It sends pp to A.
(b) Leakage queries: A sends polynomially many leakage queries (in the form polynomialsized circuits) L 1 , . . . , L s where L i has output length at most ρ|t|, and i ∈ [s] for some s = poly(λ). The queries are chosen adaptively and answered as follows. At the start of this phase, the challenger sets i = 1 and The output of the game is whatever A outputs: w.l.o.g. the output is a single bit.
2. Hard to sample a non-injective branch even given the inversion trapdoor: roughly speaking, we require that no PPT algorithm A, given (pp, t) sampled by Setup(1 λ , b * ) for a random b * , can compute a branch b such that the function Eval(pp, b, ·) is not injective except with negligible probability. Formally, for every PPT algorithm A and every sufficiently large λ ∈ N,
where E denotes the event b * ← B λ , (pp, t) ← Setup(1 λ , b * ), b ← A(pp, t) and µ is a negligible function.
It is straightforward to extend this definition to allow leakage during setup and update phases.
Allowing general sampling algorithms. Our current formulation works with two uniform and independent branches (b, b * ) without worrying about how they are sampled. We consider a slightly more general definition where the algorithm for sampling the branches, say Samp, outputs an encoded branch (instead of the actual branch); a public decoding function is then used to compute the actual branch from the encoding. Two independent executions of Samp are used to sample branch encodings, which are then decoded. We require that the distribution of the decoded branches be statistically close to uniform over B λ × B λ . In addition, during the Challenge phase, the challenger sends the encoding of the challenge branch.
Formally, in the general definition, an (n, k, ρ)-CLR-LTDF is defined as above, except that we modify Game ρ A (1 λ , d) as follows. 7 For a non-uniform polynomial time algorithm Samp (with advice z) and a collection of decoding functions H, we change the Init phase as follows. The challenger samples a random decoding function h ← H. It then samples two encodings e ← Samp(1 λ , z) and e * ← Samp(1 λ , z) to define the branches b = h(e) and b * = h(e * ). Branch b * is used as the lossy branch (as before). We require that for a randomly chosen h, (h(e), h(e * )) is statistically close to the uniform distribution over the pair of branches, and call (Samp, H) to be good if they satisfy this requirement. Both h and pp are sent during Init phase. During the Challenge phase, if d = 0, encoding e is sent, otherwise e * is sent. We require that (1) holds for all good (Samp, H).
Our construction
We now present our construction. As described in Section 1.2, our construction of CLR-LTDF is inspired by the ABO functions of [PW08] which samples a n × n matrix A whose entries are (ElGamal) encryptions of 0 with correlated randomness. The function description is then set to g M where M = A + b * I, I denotes the identity matrix, and b * is lossy branch. The function evaluation on (b, x) is g (M−bI)x .
Our construction uses a similar approach and uses BKKV encryption instead of ElGamal. The branches in our construction will be a collection of n vectors, denoted by a matrix B n×1 = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) T where every b i ∈ Z p . Each b i can be interpreted as a BKKV encryption of 1, and it can also be used as a one-time pad for the diagonal elements of A. Matrix M will now be matrix A whose diagonal entries are "masked", i.e., set to a ii + b i for i ∈ [n].
The construction. We will be working with prime-order bilinear groups. It will be convenient to assume the existence of a universal setup algorithm G(λ) which sets up some universal parameters such as the bilinear groups, bilinear map, a generator, and the set of branches B λ . That is, G(1 λ ) is a randomized algorithm which outputs global parameters params = (p, G, G T , g, e) where p is a random prime of length λ, G and G T groups of order p, and g is a generators of G. Let n, k, ρ be functions of λ, as defined earlier.
We define the set of branches to be B λ = {Z p } n . That is, a branch B ∈ B λ is a collection of vectors (denoted as a matrix as per our notation) as:
We abuse the notation and continue to denote this modified game by Game [n]. We will assume that all algorithms described below has access to the global parameters params. 8 The four algorithms of our CLR-LTDF Π clr−ltdf := (Setup, Eval, Inv, Update) are as follows. 9
Setup(1 λ , B * ). Sample two uniformly random vectors v 1 and v 2 in Z p , and two uniformly random n × n matrices of rank one, namely R = [r ij ] and S = [s ij ] from Rank (v 1 , v 2 ) .
Compute the matrix A := M B * := [a ij ] as follows:
Note that the operation affects only the diagonal entries of M. The public-parameter is defined to be pp = g A . To compute the trapdoor, choose a matrix T
Eval(pp, B, x). Let x ∈ {0, 1} n be a bit vector. The algorithm outputs g Y such that:
Note that g A is easily computed given (g A , B); likewise, g Y is easily computed given (g A , x). 10
Update(pp, g T ). Choose a full rank matrix V ∈ Z 2×2 p and output T = g V T . The update operation essentially samples two random vectors in the row-span of T .
Inv(pp, g T , g Y ). Let g Y = (g y 1 , . . . , g yn ) T and let the two rows of g T be g t 1 and g t 2 . Output a bit vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) where, for every i ∈ [n], bit z i = 0 if y i is orthogonal to both t 1 and t 2 ; otherwise z i = 1. Recall that if g y = (g y 1 , . . . , g y ) ∈ G and g t = (g t 1 , . . . , g t ) ∈ G for y ∈ {y 1 , . . . , y n } and t ∈ {t 1 , t 2 }, then y is orthogonal t if and only if i e g y i , g t i = 1.
This completes the description of our function. The main theorem of this section is stated below. As noted earlier, the proof makes use of the fact that branches act as a one-time pad to successfully program that a future BKKV challenge can be appropriately mapped to either an injective or a lossy branch while still allowing the reduction to answer leakage queries. To be precise, the reduction works directly with a "matrix DDH" challenger instead of BKKV challenges. This is because the proof requires several steps that are specific to lossy trapdoor functions; it is unclear whether a "semi automatic" reduction to BKKV exists.
Theorem 6. Under the validity of the matrix DDH assumption, the tuple (Setup, Eval, Update, Inv) specifies a (n, k, ρ)-CLR-LTDF over the domain {0, 1} n for every polynomial n where k = n − 2 lg p and ρ = 1 2 − 3+γ for every ≥ 7, γ > 0 8 We note that assuming such a G is only for convenience and without loss of generality. Indeed, we can assume G to be a part of the Setup algorithm. Since the length of the generated prime p is independent of p and only depends on λ, we can set B λ = ({0, 1} lg p ) n which is independent of p and always a subset of (Z p ) n .
9 We remind the reader that uppercase letters, such as A, R, S, denote matrices of scalars (e.g., elements of Zp), whereas bold uppercase letters, such as A, denote matrices of vectors (e.g. elements of Z p or G ). Bold lowercase letter such as x represent vectors with only scalar entries.
10 Recall that i-th row of A x contains a vector in the span of the vectors in the i-th row of A . See section 2.
Proof. Let us first verify the correctness and lossiness of our construction. For any given branch B and input x, consider the matrix Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) T = A x = (M (B * − B)) x. Letting B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and expanding, we see that:
where
To see that the function is lossy when B = B * , observe that in this case Y = Mx. Recall that M was constructed using matrices R and S of rank 1. In particular,
The range of both Rx and Sx is of size at most p, and therefore the size of the range of Mx is at most p 2 . The function is lossy with k = n − 2 lg p.
The following lemma proves the indistinguishability of injective and lossy branches under continual leakage attack.
Lemma 7. For every PPT adversary
Proof. We prove the claim by designing a set of hybrid experiments. For simplicity we will drop subscripts and define hybrid
Next consider the following two hybrids:
Same as H 0 (d) except that matrices R and S (see Setup) are sampled to be random matrices (and therefore are unlikely to have rank 1).
Same as H 1 (d) except that this experiment updates the existing trapdoor differently. That is, whenever Update algorithm should be executed, the challenger in this experiment samples two uniformly random vectors in the space kernel(v 1 , v 2 ) and sets that as the new trapdoor. 11
We claim that under the linear assumption, H 0 (d) and H 1 (d) are computationally indistinguishable. This is because both experiments can be executed in polynomial time given (g R , g S ) and without knowing their rank. Further, if R, S are rank-1 then the resulting experiment would be H 0 (d) and if they are random (therefore statistically close to full rank), it will be H 1 (d).
Next we claim that H 1 (d) and H 2 (d) are also computationally indistinguishable. To prove this, consider a random basis X ∈ Z ×( −2) p of the space kernel(v 1 , v 2 ). Note that such a basis can be computed efficiently in polynomial time given (v 1 , v 2 ). Suppose that we are given a challenge matrix in the exponent g C such that C ∈ Z ( −2)×( −2) p is either a random rank-2 matrix or a random full rank matrix. Further, if we let g T 0 = g T , g T 1 , . . . represent the trapdoors after each update procedure, then we can set g T i = g X.C.V i where V i ∈ Z −2×2 p is random matrix; and this value can be efficiently computed given only g C , X, V i for every i. In addition, if C has rank 2 (resp., full) then the trapdoors are distributed identically to how they are distributed in H 1 (d) (resp., H 2 (d)). Distinguish H 1 from H 2 therefore violates the linear assumption and the claim follows. 12 To complete the proof, we need to show that,
We prove this by setting up n hybrids H 2,1 , . . . , H 2,n . In these hybrids, instead of sending either B or B * during the challenge phase, we will send a "hybrid" branch whose first i coordinates match B and rest n − i match B * . Since these branches "mask" the diagonal of matrix A, these hybrids are equivalent to setting up the diagonal of A so that first i entries, when "unmasked", reveal a BKKV-encryption of 0 and the rest n − i that of 1.
Formally, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} hybrid H 2,i is defined below; define H 2,0 to be the same as H 2 (0).
H 2,i : This hybrid is identical to H 2,i−1 except that during the challenge phase it sends the "hybrid" branch B i defined as follows. Let B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and B * = (b * 1 , . . . , b * n ) be the branches sampled (by the challenger) at the start of the experiment. Then,
Note that H 2,n is the same as H 2 (1) since B n = B * .
To complete the proof, we need to show that H 2,i ≡ c H 2,i+1 for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. This is the final part of the argument where the proof flows along the lines of BKKV with one key difference. As in BKKV, our challenger will also set up a "crooked" trapdoor from which it can answer leakage queries directly. However, in order to be able to apply theorem 4, it must ensure that prior to selecting the leakage function, the adversary has no information about the subspace from which the crooked trapdoor is sampled. This, however, is ensured by our construction since the branch B * acts as a one-time pad to information theoretically hide the "BKKV challenge" that gets revealed in the end.
Formally, consider the following hybrid. (For convenience let us call v 1 , v 2 in our procedures to be the reference vectors and M the reference matrix ). H * 2,i : This hybrid uses a slightly different way to sample the parameters and trapdoors than H 2,i ; nevertheless, it results in identical distributions. The hybrid uses a matrix C ∈ Z 3×3 p of rank at least 2, sampled uniformly at the start of the execution. 13 The challenger samples a random matrix Y ∈ Z 3× p ; it also samples a random basis X ∈ Z ×( −3) p for the space kernel(Y ). We view Y as a row matrix and X as a column matrix. Next, the challenger computes the matrix CY and let v 1 , v 2 , v 3 to be its 3 rows.
The challenger now uses vectors v 1 , v 2 as reference vectors and samples M, B * , A and B exactly as in the previous hybrid H 2,i . However, it sets T $ ← kernel 2 (v 1 , v 2 ). Note that span(X) is always a subspace of kernel(v 1 , v 2 ). Recall that the hybrid branch B i is also set as before: first i coordinates from B * and last n − i from B. Note that v 3 is not used in this hybrid.
Since Y is random and C is a random matrix of rank≥ 2, distribution of v 1 , v 2 is identical in H 2,i and H * 2,i . All other values are sampled in the same way in both hybrids, and therefore H 2,i and H * 2,i are identical. Next, we intend to use "crooked" trapdoors and apply theorem 4. However, the application of this theorem is slightly tricky and we actually need to consider two cases separately: depending on whether rank of C is 3 or 2. This makes the description of the next hybrid look somewhat complex, but actually it is simple at a high level. There are two main changes. First, the trapdoors come from the subspace defined by span(X). Second, we wish to output a branch B ch so that a jj − B ch [j] = v 3 where j = i + 1 is for succinctness. The purpose of the second part will become clear shortly. The description follows.
G (2)
i : The challenger samples C ← Z 3×3 p of rank 2. It also samples matrices Y and X as before, and sets (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) to be the rows of matrix CY . It then samples B, B * as before and a random challenge vector c ∈ Z p . Finally, the remaining quantities are sampled as follows (for succinctness we let j = i + 1):
1. Sample all entries of matrix A as before except a jj , which is set to a jj = v 3 + c.
Sample the trapdoor T $
← span 2 (X); all subsequent updates are also sampled in the same way.
3. In the challenge phase, send the following challenge branch:
i : Same as above except that C has full rank (i.e., three).
We first prove that G
i is statistically close to H * 2,i+1 . The proof is as follows. First we note that A is distributed identically in both hybrids since a jj is uniformly random in G (2) i as well. The only difference is that the leakage occurs on vectors from span(X) which is a subspace of kernel(v 1 , v 2 ). Note that g A contains no information about the subspace X.(In fact this holds even if v 3 were given, since C has rank 2). Therefore we can apply theorem 4 to conclude that the execution of the two hybrids are statistically close up to the challenge phase. When B ch is revealed, note that c is revealed. The distribution of c is uniform under the condition that a jj − c distributed uniformly in span(v 1 , v 2 ). Note that this is identical to the distribution of b * i+1 in game H 2,i+1 ; all other branch components are identically distributed in both hybrids. To compute the statistical distance between G (2) i and H * 2,i+1 , note that the random subspace X has dimension l × l − 3. Let W be the range of any leakage function L. Since L leaks ρ fraction of the secret key, |W | = p ρ.2l . From theorem 4 it follows that the statistical distance is bounded by poly(λ) |W |/p l−6 . For this quantity to be negligible, it suffices to satisfy ρ.2l < l − 6. Hence, for all γ > 0, ρ = l−6−γ 2l
ensures that H 2,i+1 and G (2) i are statistically indistinguishable. Next we prove that G (3) i is statistically close to H * 2,i . By the same argument as above g A is distributed identically in both hybrids. In addition, since c is chosen independently and uniformly, distribution of v 3 is independent from g A . Therefore, the leakage function is also independent of v 3 and hence the subspace X. We can therefore apply theorem 4 as above to conclude that the execution of these hybrids are statistically close up to the challenge phase. When B ch is revealed, note that c is revealed. The distribution of c is uniform under the condition that a jj − c = v 3 is uniformly distributed in Z p . Note that this is identical to the distribution of b i+1 in game H 2,i ; all other branch components are identically distributed in both hybrids. Note that revealing v 3 is equivalent to revealing the subspace X. However, since theorem 4 holds even given X, we have that the two hybrids remain statistically close even after the challenge phase.
Finally, observe that both hybrids G We complete the proof of the theorem with the following lemma.
Lemma 8. It is hard to sample a non-injective branch against our scheme.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A * which outputs a non-injective branch with probability = 1/q for some polynomial q. That is, A returns a branch containing a coordinate b i for some i ∈ [n] such that b * i − b i is orthogonal to both trapdoor vectors t 1 , t 2 . We show how to use A * to solve the discrete log problem.
Consider the following adversary B which, except with negligible probability, on input a vector g b * ∈ G returns a random vector t and a scalar α such that t, b * i = α (all computations modulo some prime p). To do so, B first runs the setup algorithm our construction on a random B * and let A = [a ij ] be the matrix in the exponent. B multiplies g b * to the j-th element of the diagonal so that the new matrix in the exponent becomes A which is same A except that a jj = a jj + b * . Trapdoors for A are also valid trapdoors for A and distributed uniformly; except that now the lossy branch becomes B * -same as B * but j-th coordinate differ by an additive term b * . B runs A * on these new parameters (distributed correctly) to obtain a b * i so that (a ii − b * i ) is orthogonal to the trapdoor vectors and j = i with probability /n = 1/nq. 14 Repeating this experiment n 2 / = n 2 q times finds a b * j with probability exp(−n). If b * j is found in one of the experiments, B returns one of the trapdoors in that experiment, say t, and its scalar product α = t, (b * j − a jj ) where a jj is j-th diagonal element of A.
Running B for times yields equations with entries of b * as variables; these equations are linearly independent w.h. probability. Solving the equations yieldss b * . The discrete-log challenge is solved by planting it in one of the coordinates of b * and sampling the rest uniformly. This completes proof.
This completes the proof.
Remark. Our proof is not sensitive to how the branches are sampled in the game, so long as they are uniform and independent over the branch space. Therefore, it actually proves the general version of the definition where the branch encodings are sampled using an arbitrary non-uniform PPT sampler Samp, and then decoded efficiently using a random function from H. 15 14 Orthogonality is tested using pairings and therefore knowing g a jj and the trapdoor is sufficient. 15 More specifically, we work with hash functions with the property that for any given input x of high min-entropy, it is possible to sample (h, b) such that h(x) = b and (h, b) are statistically close to uniform distribution over H × B λ . In the i-th hybrid, use encoding ei to output the hybrid branch Bi.
Universal hash property. Our lossy TDF functions have the property that on lossy branches the function acts as a universal hash function. We capture this property in the following lemma, which will be useful later.
Lemma 9. Let Π clr−ltdf := (Setup, Eval, Inv, Update) be the construction in 3.2. Then, for every sufficiently large λ ∈ N and every b * ∈ B λ , the function family {F pp,b * } over {0, 1} n defined as F pp,b * (x) := Eval(pp, b * , x) is universal with respect to the following algorithm for sampling the functions: compute (pp, t) ← Setup(1 λ , b * ) and output (pp, b * ).
Proof. We show that for every distinct x 1 , x 2 , the collision probability Pr [F pp,b * (x 1 ) = F pp,b * (x 2 )] ≤ 1/ξ; here ξ ≤ p 2 is the size of the range of F pp,b * and the probability is taken over the sampling of pp using Setup. Recall that p is a large prime fixed by the global setup algorithm G Recall that sampling pp involves sampling a matrix M, and from equation (2), F pp,b * (x) = Mx where i-th entry is a vector y i of the form:
. Further recall that R and S are rank 1 matrices and v 1 and v 2 are random vectors.
Vectors v 1 , v 2 are not parallel w.h.p.; it will be convenient to work with orthogonal vectors. Therefore, let u 1 be the component of v 2 that is parallel to v 1 , i.e., u 1 = v 1 ,v 2 ||v 2 || · v 1 . Then u 2 = v 2 − u 1 is orthogonal to v 1 and we can write y i in terms of u 1 and u 2 :
A collision occurs for two vectors x 1 , x 2 if and only if Mx 1 = Mx 2 ⇒ M(x 1 − x 2 ) = 0. Using (3), it follows that since u 1 ⊥u 2 , this can happen if and only if R(x 1 − x 2 ) = S(x 1 − x 2 ) = 0. That is, if we define h A (x) = Ax for a rank-1 n × n matrix in Z p and x ∈ {0, 1} n , then a collision occurs for F pp,b * if and only if collision occurs on both of its component functions h R and h S . It is easy to check that h A is a universal hash function, and since R and S independently chosen, it follows that F pp,b * is also universal.
Leakage Resilient Deterministic PKE
In this section, we define leakage-resilient D-PKE and its security, and show that our CLR-LTDF yield such a scheme when branch b is set to h(m) provided certain conditions on h and the entropy of m are met.
Modeling deterministic PKE under continual leakage
A deterministic public-key encryption scheme is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms Π = (KG, Enc, Dec, Update). The key-generation algorithm KG is a randomized algorithm which on input the security parameter 1 λ outputs a pair (pk, sk) of a public key pk and a secret key sk. The encryption algorithm Enc is deterministic, takes as input 1 λ , a public key pk, and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n(λ) , and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} t(λ) . The (possibly deterministic) decryption algorithm Dec takes as input 1 λ , a secret key sk, and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} t(λ) , and outputs either a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n(λ) or the special symbol ⊥. Algorithm Update(pk, sk ) is a randomized update algorithm which, given pk, and a secret-key sk for pk, outputs a new secret-key sk such that |sk | = |sk |; input sk is either sk or one of the outputs of Update. We call sk to be the refreshed or updated secret-key. We require that the outputs of Dec is identical on sk or sk (which is output of Update). For succinctness, we will always assume 1 λ as an implicit input to all algorithms and refrain from explicitly specifying it.
We now define our security notion, namely CLR-PRIV1-IND security. It is essentially a direct extension of the standard PRIV1-IND definition in the leakage-free setting. PRIV1-IND is the "single challenge" version of the PRIV-IND definition which requires that, roughly speaking, the encryptions of two sequences of messages be computationally indistinguishable provided that each message has sufficient min-entropy and the sequences have same "equality pattern." Formally, these requirements are captured by defining a α-source q-message adversary, which is also relevant to our definition. 16 The α-source q-message adversary. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, and let α = α(λ) and q = q(λ) be functions of the security parameter λ ∈ N. For any λ ∈ N denote by (M
λ , ST AT E λ ) the distribution corresponding to the output of A 1 (1 λ ). Then, A is a α-source q-message adversary if the following properties hold:
q,λ is a distribution over sequences of q plaintexts for each b ∈ {0, 1}. 
We are now ready to define the continual-leakage-resilient version of PRIV1-IND security, namely CLR-PRIV1-IND. The definition is same as PRIV1-IND security except that the adversary is allowed to ask leakage queries before receiving the challenge encryption.
CLR-PRIV1-IND Security. A deterministic public-key encryption scheme Π = (KG, Enc, Dec, Update) is CLR-PRIV1-IND-secure for α(λ)-source 1-message adversaries with leakage-parameter ρ if for any probabilistic polynomial-time α(λ)-source 1-message adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) there exists a negligible function ν(λ) such that
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, where Expt
(b) is defined as follows:
1. Init: sample (pk, sk) ← KG(1 λ ), and send pk to A 2 .
2. Leakage queries: set i = 1 and sk 1 = sk; interact with A 2 , answering every leakage query L i whose output length is at most ρ · |sk|, as follows. Send σ i = L i (sk i ) to A 2 , and set sk i+1 ← Update(pk, sk i ) and i = i + 1.
3. Challenge: sample (m 0 , m 1 , state) ← A 1 (1 λ ) and set c ← Enc pk (m b ); send (c, state) to A 2 . Output of A 2 is the output of the experiment.
Remark. It is not necessary to sample (m 0 , m 1 , state) ← A 1 (1 λ ) in the Challenge phase. Instead, they can be sampled during the Init phase so long as they are kept completely outside the view of the adversary; Challenge phase then only computes c and sends (c, state) to A 2 . From here on, we shall work with this modified version. Also, the advantage can also be mentioned in terms of probability p of correctly guessing which distribution the encrypted message comes from; it is easy to see that the advantage above comes out to be |2p − 1|.
Our deterministic public-key encryption scheme
The construction. Let Π clr−ltdf := (Setup, Eval, Inv, Update) be a (n, k, ρ)-CLR-LTDF which satisfies the universal hash property with respect to lossy branches. Let s = s(λ) be a polynomial describing the length of branches b ∈ B λ . 17 Let H = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} s } be a family of universal hash functions. The message space of the scheme is {0, 1} n . The key-generation algorithm KG samples h ← H, b * ← B λ , (pp, t) ← Setup(1 λ , b * ). It outputs pk = (h, pp) and sk = t. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input pp and a message x ∈ {0, 1} n . It outputs y = Eval(pp, b, x) where b = h(x) is used as the branch. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input y, sk, and pk = (h, pp). It outputs x = Inv(pp, sk, y) if x is valid and ⊥ otherwise. The update algorithm of the scheme is the same as Update.
We denote this scheme by Π clr−de := (KG, Enc, Dec, Update). It is easy to verify the correctness of this scheme. We now prove the security of this scheme in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Scheme Π clr−de is a CLR-PRIV1-IND secure scheme for α(λ)-source 1-message adversary with leakage parameter ρ provided that Π clr−ltdf is a (n, k, ρ)-CLR-LTDF and:
where is an arbitrary negligible function in λ.
Proof. The strategy for proving this is similar to [BFO08] where, at a high level, we first replace injective branches with lossy branches and rely on their indistinguishability; but then we argue that even though branch b = h(x) gets sampled from the message itself, it still leaves sufficient entropy in the message conditioned on b because of our choice of α and lemma 2. Since our function is universal on the lossy branches (lemma 9), we can apply the generalized LHL (lemma 1) to argue that on lossy branches, ciphertext is independent of the message. Unlike [BFO08] , we cannot simply change the injective branches to lossy since the branch changes dynamically depending on the message, and the message itself is sampled by (an adversarially chosen) distribution. Therefore, we need to work with the generalized version of CLR-LTDF which allows sampling the encoded branches.
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an α-source 1-message adversary who distinguishes Expt
(1) with non-negligible advantage. Note that, according to our remark earlier, 17 W.l.o.g. we can assume s to be quite small if necessary. If the length requires a large string to describe the branch, we can use pseudorandom generators of sufficient stretch. Since no B can have non-negligible advantage, A's advantage will also be negligible. We work with the generalized definition where Samp outputs branch encodings which are then decoded using a decoding function. Let us now define decoding functions and the sampler. Let B be a generic adversary for now.
We let the collection H of universal hash functions to be the set of branch-decoding functions; a random h ← H is chosen and fixed in the Init phase of Game We argue that (Samp 0 , H) are good, i.e., branches (b, b * ) sampled using Samp 0 are distributed uniformly and independently over the branch space. This is because of the following: encodings e and e * are independent of each other since they are sampled by two independent executions of A 1 . Since A 1 is an α source over the message space even given the state, and h is universal, by our choice of α, b (resp., b * ) is statistically close to uniform distribution over {0, 1} s due to LHL (lemma 1) even given (h, state, state ).
We will now discuss how the proof of Lemma 7 can be modified to work for the generalized definition. Note that hybrids H 0 , H 1 and H 2 can be handled trivially. This is because the challenger can choose hash function h ← H, choose encodings e 0 , e 1 using Samp 0 , compute branches B, B * using e 0 , e 1 respectively. In hybrid H 2,i , the challenger chooses h ← H and e using Samp 0 . It computes
It uses B * to compute pp, t. In the Challenge Phase, it sends e. Hybrid G (2) i can be handled similarly, while the other hybrids can be handled trivially since they do not modify the branch distribution. Since our construction of CLR-LTDF satisfies the generalized definition, it satisfies the indistinguishability of branches game for (Samp 0 , H) so defined.
We define sampler Samp 1 analogously: it is the same as Samp 0 except that it works with the second component of A 1 's output:
2. Output e := (m 1 , state) as the encoded branch.
Branches: Computed as before. Note that in this case, we will have b = h(m 1 ) and b * = h(m * 1 ) as injective and lossy branches respectively. Using the same argument as before, it follows that (Samp 1 , H) are good.
We now construct a specific adversary B to break the indistinguishability of branches. B participates in the game Game (a) for A 2 . This is because of the following. First, the distribution of pk is identical to the public-key in CLR-PRIV1-IND game, and all leakage queries are also answered identically. In the Challenge phase, since Samp a is used as the sampler and d = 0 (injective case), the challenge encoding e received by B is always e a := (m a , state). Therefore, c = Eval(pp, h(m a ), m a ) is a correctly generated ciphertext of a correctly distributed plaintext m a along with the state variable. Therefore, A 2 correctly guesses the bit a, i.e., a = a with probability p = , 1) , the ciphertext c computed by B looses all information about m * a , this is because due to Lemma 1 and Lemma 9 c is statistically close to the ciphertext of a uniformly random message. Therefore, A 2 's view is statistically independent of the bit a. It follows that in this case a = a with probability at most q = 
Application to CCA Security under Continual Leakage
In this section we demonstrate, by constructing a CCA secure PKE in the continual leakage model, that our formulation of CLR-LTDF is of general interest. It can be just as useful in "leakage world" as the original lossy TDFs in the "leakage free" setting.
We now describe how to construct a leakage-resilient CCA secure cryptosystem using our leakage-resilient LTDF primitive. Our construction is similar to the respective construction of [PW08] and the security proof follows closely their security proof. Our CCA secure encryption system uses four underlying primitives: a CLR-LTDF family, an ABO-LTDF family, a pairwise independent hash function family, and an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme. Notice that to achieve leakage resilience only the first family has to be leakage resilient. In [PW08] there was a regular LTDF instead of a CLR-LTDF. All the parameters of our system depend on the security parameter λ and therefore, for simplicity, we omit this explicit dependence.
Let (Setup clr , Eval clr , Inv clr , Update clr ) be a collection of (n, k, ρ)-continual leakage resilient lossy trapdoor functions (CLR-LTDF) with branch sets B λ = {0, 1} v . Also, let (Setup abo , Eval abo , Inv abo ) be a collection of (n, k ) all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions (ABO-LTDF) with branch sets B λ = {0, 1} w , and let (Setup σ , Sign σ , Vrfy σ ) be an one-time strongly unforgeable scheme (OT-SUF) with verification keys vk ∈ {0, 1} w = B λ . We require that the total lossiness k + k ≥ n + κ for a parameter κ = ω(log(n)). Finally, let H be a pairwise independent hash function family from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} where ≤ κ − 2 log(1/ ) for some negligible ∈ negl(λ). Our cryptosystem Π consists of the following four polynomial time algorithms and its message space is {0, 1} .
The algorithm first picks a uniformly random branch b * R ← {0, 1} v = B λ . Then it calls Setup clr (1 λ , b * ) → (pp clr , t) and Setup abo (1 λ , 0 w ) → (pp abo , t * ). Also it picks a uniformly random hash function h R ← H. It outputs:
Notice that the branch b * and the trapdoor t * are not used. Update(pk, sk) → sk : The update algorithm takes a public key pk = (pp clr , pp abo , h) and a secret key sk = t and outputs sk = t where t = Update clr (pp clr , t).
We argue that the above system is a correct, continual-leakage resilient, CCA-secure public key encryption system. Firstly we will prove that Π decrypts correctly all messages with probability 1 minus negligible.
Let ct = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , vk σ , σ) be a ciphertext produced by the above encryption algorithm. During decryption we would have that Vrfy σ (vk σ , (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), σ) = true according to the correctness of the one-time signature scheme. Therefore the decryption algorithm would compute x = Inv clr (pp clr , t , c 1 ), where t is the secret key that might have been updated several times. According to the injective property of CLR-LTDFs , this would return the original x ∈ {0, 1} n unless with negligible probability µ(λ). If it returns the original x, both checks c 1 = Eval clr (pp clr , c 3 , x) and c 2 = Eval abo (pp abo , vk σ , x) would succeed with probability 1, since both evaluation algorithms are deterministic. Since h is also deterministic, the decryption algorithm retrieves the original message m.
What remains is to prove the following theorem regarding the CCA security of Π.
Theorem 11. Scheme Π = (Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt, Update) is a ρ-continual-leakage resilient CCA secure public key encryption system under the assumptions that (Setup clr , Eval clr ,
is an OT-SUF signature scheme, H is a pairwise independent hash function family, and all parameters satisfy the above relations.
In order to prove theorem 11 we define the following sequence of games. For completeness, we briefly describe the continual leakage CCA game.
Continual Leakage CCA Game: In the Init phase the challenger calls Setup(1 λ ) and gives the public key pk to the attacker. In query Phase-1, the attacker can make leakage queries and decryption queries to the challenger in a fully adaptive way. The leakage queries are of the form of polynomial-sized circuits L i with output size at most ρ|sk|. The challenger replies to the attacker with L i (sk) and updates the secret key to sk = Update(pk, sk). The decryption queries consist of ciphertexts ct i and the challenger responds with Decrypt(pk, sk, ct i ). In the challenge phase Challenge, the attacker sends two messages m 0 and m 1 , the challenger flips a random coin c R ← {0, 1}, and it replies with the ciphertext ct * = Encrypt(pk, m c ). The next phase is query Phase-2 where the attacker can only make decryption queries as above. The only restriction is that all the queried ciphertexts must be different than the challenge ciphertext ct * . Finally, in the Guess phase the attacker tries to guess the bit c.
Game-1:
The first game we define for our scheme is the same as the CL-CCA game with the difference that the verification key vk * σ that is used in the challenge ciphertext ct * is generated at the beginning of the game (in the Init phase). Namely, in the Init phase the challenger calls Setup σ (1 λ ) → (vk * σ , sk * σ ) and in the Challenge phase the Encrypt(pk, m c ) call uses (vk * σ , sk * σ ) to generate the ciphertext instead of generating a new key pair.
Game-2:
This game is the same as Game-1 except the treatment of the decryption queries. In this game if the attacker makes a decryption query ct i = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , vk σ , σ) with vk = vk * , then the challenger immediately replies with ⊥, instead of calling the decryption algorithm. Notice that since vk * is generated and known to the challenger at the beginning of the game, this is a well-defined security game.
Game-3: This game differs from the previous one only in the Init phase. Remember that the challenger calls Setup σ (1 λ ) → (vk * σ , sk * σ ) at the beginning of this phase. After doing that it calls a new setup algorithm for the scheme Setup * (1 λ ) which is the same as Setup(1 λ ) except that the ABO-LTDF is created with Setup abo (1 λ , vk * ) → (pp abo , t * ). Namely, the ABO lossy branch is vk * ∈ B .
Game-4: The only difference of this game from Game-3 is that the challenger does not call x = Inv clr (pp clr , t, c 1 ) for decryption queries anymore, but x = Inv abo (pp abo , t * , vk σ , c 2 ). Namely, it has stored the ABO trapdoor t * during the Init phase and uses this to decrypt the ciphertext. The other computations of the Decrypt algorithm remain the same. We remind that, as in the previous games, when it gets a decryption query with vk σ = vk * σ it outputs ⊥ immediately. Game-5: The final game differs from the previous one in the Challenge phase. During the encryption of the challenge ciphertext the challenger does not call b R ← B λ but sets c 3 = b = b * . Therefore, it computes the c 1 component using the lossy branch of the CLR-LTDF as c 1 = Eval clr (pp clr , b * , x).
We will prove the following lemmas that conclude the proof of theorem 11.
Lemma 12. The advantage of any PPT attacker playing the CL-CCA game is the same as the advantage of the same attacker playing Game-1.
Proof. This lemma is obvious, since the only difference in the two games is the time of when the Setup σ (1 λ ) → (vk * σ , sk * σ ) is called. In the first game it is called during the Challenge phase while in the second during the Init phase. The distribution of all inputs to the attacker is exactly the same.
Lemma 13. The advantage of any PPT attacker playing Game-1 is negligibly close to the advantage of the same attacker playing Game-2, given that the signature scheme (Setup σ , Sign σ , Vrfy σ ) is OT-SUF secure.
Proof. To prove this lemma, let E define the event that a PPT attacker A makes at least one decryption query ct i = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , vk σ , σ) such that vk σ = vk * σ , the signature σ is valid, and the ciphertext ct i = ct * (in case ct i is done in Phase-2). The two games differ only when this event happens. We claim that the probability of E is negligible in λ in both games, under the assumption that the signature scheme (Setup σ , Sign σ , Vrfy σ ) is OT-SUF secure. Therefore, the difference in the advantage is also negligible.
To prove this let's assume that the probability of E in one of the games is non-negligible. Then we can build a successful PPT attacker B on the signature scheme. B will simulate the security game and use A to break the scheme. First B receives a verification key vk from its challenger. This key will take the place of vk * in the security game. Then B proceeds in playing the security game until E happens (before that both games are exactly the same). That is, it calls Setup(1 λ ), answers leakage queries, and answers decryption queries that do not satisfy the restrictions of the event E. B can do this since it has the secret key t. During the Challenge phase, it creates a valid ciphertext ct * with the verification key vk * = vk , but in order to create the signature σ * , it queries its signature challenger with the message (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) .
In case the event E happens in Phase-1, the attacker A requested a decryption on the ciphertext ct i = c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , vk σ , σ with Vrfy σ (vk , (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , σ) = true. At this point the simulator B outputs ((c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , σ) as a valid forgery. In that case B breaks the OT-SUF scheme without having done any signature queries.
In case the event E happens in Phase-2, we know that ct i = ct * . Again B outputs ((c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), σ) as a forgery. Since this is different from the challenge ciphertext, it is also a successful forgery for the OT-SUF scheme.
Lemma 14. The advantage of any PPT attacker playing Game-2 is negligibly close to the advantage of the same attacker playing Game-3, given the hidden lossy branch property of the ABO-TDF (Setup abo , Eval abo , Inv abo ).
Proof. We will prove this lemma by describing a simulator B that can distinguish the lossy branch from the injective one when given access to an oracle O. The oracle takes as inputs two branches b 0 , b 1 ∈ B and outputs the public parameters of the ABO-TDF using one of the two branches with probability 1/2.
The simulator works by calling Setup σ (1 λ ) → (vk * σ , sk * σ ) and then calling the oracle with O(vk * σ , 0 w ) → pp abo . All operations for the games are computed as defined except the Setup abo (1 λ , ·) → (pp abo , t * ). The simulator uses for pp abo the public parameters it received from the oracle. Notice that it knows the secret key t (but not t * ), and therefore it can answer all leakage and decryption queries. As before decryption queries with vk σ = vk * σ are answered with ⊥. Notice that, depending on the choice of the oracle, B simulates perfectly Game-2 or Game-3.
Lemma 15. The advantage of any PPT attacker playing Game-3 is negligibly close to the advantage of the same attacker playing Game-4 given that it is hard to sample a non-injective branch from the CLR-LTDF (Setup clr , Eval clr , Inv clr , Update clr ).
Proof. The two games differ solely on the computations during the decryption queries. We will prove that with 1 minus probability the outputs of the decryption queries are exactly the same. According to the property of the CLR-LTDF family the probability that one of the branches c 3 = b in the decryption queries gives a non injective function is negligible in λ. Therefore we assume that all the decryption queries contain injective branches for the CLR-LTDF.
In both games when the decryption query has vk σ = vk * σ the output is the same: ⊥. If this is not the case, the decryption algorithm calculates an x, either by x = Inv clr (pp clr , t, c 1 ) in Game-3 or x = Inv abo (pp abo , t * , vk σ , c 2 ) in Game-4. Then it asserts that c 1 = Eval clr (pp clr , c 3 , x) and c 2 = Eval abo (pp abo , vk σ , x). According to the above assumption and since vk σ = vk * σ , we know that both functions are injective. This means that for a pair (c 1 , c 2 ) there is either a unique x that satisfies both relations or none. In Game-3 this x is found by inverting the CLR-LTDF, while in Game-4 it is found by inverting the ABO-TDF. If there is no such x one of the two checks will fail and in both games the challenger will output ⊥.
Lemma 16. The advantage of any PPT attacker playing Game-4 is negligibly close to the advantage of the same attacker playing Game-5, given the indistinguishability of lossy branch under continual memory leakage of the CLR-LTDF (Setup clr , Eval clr , Inv clr , Update clr ).
Proof. In order to prove this lemma we will construct a PPT attacker B on the indistinguishability game of the CLR-LTDF if the difference in the advantage of any PPT attacker A is more than negligible. According to the lossy branch indistinguishability game the simulator/attacker B receives the public parameters pp clr from its challenger where (pp clr , t) ← Setup clr (1 λ , b * ). Notice that the simulator does not know the lossy branch b * or the trapdoor t.
However it simulates Game-4 and Game-5 by calling (vk * σ , sk * σ) ← Setup σ (1 λ ) and (pp abo , t * ) ← Setup abo (1 λ , vk * σ ). Notice that it knows the trapdoor t * and the verification key vk * . Therefore it can answer the decryption queries according to the rules of the games. For the leakage queries on the trapdoor t, B forwards them to its challenger.
In the Challenge phase B requests the challenge branch from its challenger. It uses this in order to create the challenge ciphertext ct * . If this branch is the injective branch b, B simulates
